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Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the potential demographic directions 
for Australia over the next 50 years. It also addresses key social 
and economic issues related to the transformations taking place 
in the make-up of Australia’s population. These issues include 
the ageing of the population, future labour supply and the age 
structure of the labour force. As with most developed countries 
of the world, ageing is inevitable in the future direction of the 
Australian population but, as this chapter demonstrates, changes 
in demographic pathways may make a significant difference to 
the extent of future ageing. Given these trends, this should be a 
key national policy issue for Australia and should be central to 
economic, social and governmental strategies and 
considerations. However, despite the Australian Government’s 
Treasury making reference to ‘the three Ps’ – ‘participation, 
productivity and population’ – as being key influences in 
Australia’s economic future, it has tended, in its policy 
approaches, to emphasise participation and productivity rather 
than population (Department of Treasury, 2002). 
There is a tendency for economists and planners to ignore the 
‘third P’, population, because they work on the assumption that 
future demography is ‘exogenous’ to the economic models 
upon which planning is based. This effectively means that future 
demography will not be affected by future economic trends. 
Instead future demography is extrapolated from trends in past 
demography and then becomes the ‘front end’ of complex 
economic planning models. The implicit assumption of this 
approach is that the economy is expected to adjust to whatever 
future demography there turns out to be. Population policy in 
this context becomes an irrelevance. However, concern about 
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the lack of a national ageing population policy was emphasised 
by an Australian Productivity Commission press release 
announcing its 2005 report ‘Economic Implications of an 
Ageing Australia’ which stated that, “in the absence of other 
policy actions to reduce fiscal pressure, taxation levels would 
need to rise by 21 per cent by 2044–45, or the debt burden of 
ageing would become twice as large as Australia’s GDP”. The 
Productivity Commission called for policy responses on a broad 
front and at all levels of government (2005b). 
In contrast to the standard approach of economists, historical 
analysis of demographic trends shows plainly that demographic 
behaviour is strongly influenced by the contemporary economic 
and social situation. For example, in Australia in the early 1930s, 
the fertility rate fell to a very low level and international 
immigration was close to zero. A similar situation occurred in 
the mid-1970s. When the economy is unfavourable, births are 
delayed and immigration dwindles. When the economy is strong, 
birth rates rise and new migrants are attracted. 
Rather than future estimates of demography being 
predetermined inevitably and inexorably by past trends in 
demography, they should be made in consort with envisaged 
future economic, social and environmental trends. If the 
Australian economy were to go into steady decline over the next 
50 years, we could expect that population growth rates would be 
much lower than if the economy were to remain strong 
throughout that period. We cannot predict the timing of 
economic fluctuations (recessions and booms) but, at least, long-
term demographic projections should be consistent with a 
clearly stated position about broad economic and social futures. 
Those who wish to assess the accuracy of demographic 
projections can then evaluate the reliability of this position. This  
is the basis of an argument for Australia to abandon the notion 
that its future demography is pre-determined and to evaluate, 
within the bounds of probability, what demographic futures are 
likely as an integral component of desired longer-term 
economic, social and environmental goals. 
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The future economic and social setting in Australia 
The likely demographic future described in this chapter is based 
on the assumption that, in broad terms, the Australian economy 
will be strong across the coming decades. This is both the likely 
and the desirable future. This outcome is likely because 
sustained economic development of the two Asian giants, China 
and India, will underwrite continued economic growth of the 
Australian economy. The inevitable shift from oil-based energy 
to other energy forms will also be beneficial to Australia in the 
global context. Of course, Australia’s continued economic 
strength is desirable because it will bring improved future living 
standards for Australians and increased wealth that can be 
applied to the improvement of environmental, economic and 
social infrastructure. 
In summary the likely domestic implications of this future are: 
• Substantial increases in standard of living. The 
Treasury’s 2002 Intergenerational Report projected a 
doubling of the living standards of Australians between 
2002 and 2040. This was confirmed by the 2005 
Productivity Commission report: Economic Implications 
of an Ageing Australia. 
• Major investment in new physical infrastructure. 
Infrastructure development has been neglected to a 
large extent in Australia since the 1970s. Massive new 
investment is required to address environmental 
degradation including greenhouse gas emissions, water 
supply, the transformation from an oil-based economy, 
and transportation and communications inefficiencies. 
Of course, this would need to be undertaken with a 
strong regard to short-term fiscal responsibility. 
• A considerable demand for labour for the construction 
of new physical infrastructure, and new demands for 
service workers arising from increased living standards 
and the ageing of the population as ageing of Australia’s 
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population is inevitable, whatever reasonable 
assumptions are made about Australia’s future 
demography. 
• Substantial new investment in education and training 
infrastructure. This will be required to service the needs 
of the expanding economy and to deal with the rapidity 
of change in technology. We can comfortably predict 
that technology changes in the next 50 years will  
be faster than ever before in human history. The 
inevitable substantial changes in the way we live our  
lives, because of global warming, changes in energy 
forms, advances in water supply and sewerage, transport  
and communications, will demand highly skilled 
technological workers. Any country that is lacking in the 
highly sophisticated skills that will be needed to adapt 
new technologies to local environments runs the risk of 
failing to capture its share of global capital investment. 
• Changes in social institutions to enhance social cohesion 
and the capacity for all Australians to share in the 
increased wealth of the country. Social disharmony is an 
obvious threat to economic progress. It can be addressed 
through changes in the structure of the tax-transfer 
system and through investment in social infrastructures 
such as health systems, early childhood education and 
care, community services and aged services. The capacity 
for workers to combine their work and caring 
responsibilities across their lifetime will be an important 
component of this outcome. 
Labour supply: the essential integrating component 
The essential link between demographic and economic futures 
is labour supply. The neo-classical economic model sees labour 
supply largely as an effective (elastic) response to labour 
demand. Potential workers will contribute more or less of their 
supply to the labour market depending upon the demand 
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signals of the market, especially the level of wages. This model 
may have been relatively accurate in the past 30 years, but that 
was a time in which the potential labour supply grew rapidly 
because of immigration, the labour-force entry of the baby boom 
generation and the extension of the labour market to include 
much larger numbers of women. Between 1970 and 2003, the 
Australian labour force increased by around 85 per cent. On 
present population and participation trends, the future growth 
of labour supply will be considerably slower, between 10 and 20 
per cent over the next 50 years (McDonald & Kippen, 2001; 
Productivity Commission, 2005a). Fundamentally, this 
turnaround in labour potential is the result of the high fertility 
baby-boom years being succeeded by 30 years of below 
replacement levels of fertility. Future labour supply is likely to be 
much less responsive to changes in labour demand than has 
been the case in the past 30 years. 
With low unemployment and projected very slow growth of 
labour supply, particularly the supply of young technically-skilled 
workers, future labour supply is likely to be relatively inelastic to 
demand (giving rise to inflationary pressures) unless longer 
term planning of labour supply is in place. We cannot increase 
labour supply now by increasing the birth rate 25 years ago; we 
cannot increase the supply of workers with a particular skill now 
by increasing the training intake for that skill five years ago. 
While Australian immigration policy has been relatively 
responsive to immediate labour demand, the increasingly 
competitive international market for skills increases the 
unreliability of depending solely on short-term immigration 
policies to address labour shortages. 
Without being explicit about precise numbers, a strong growth 
in labour demand will be an obvious effect of a strong Australian 
economy over the coming decades. Without a major increase in 
potential labour supply, Australia will not be able to undertake 
the massive physical infrastructure projects that it needs to 
improve the degraded environment, convert to non-oil based 
energy, improve water supplies and sewerage and eliminate 
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transport and communications inefficiencies., Australia will also 
not be able to provide the number of service workers required 
by a wealthier and ageing population. Without an emphasis on 
young skilled workers, Australia will not be able to assimilate new 
technology as rapidly as needed. 
The future of fertility in Australia 
Future fertility trends depend upon more than past fertility 
trends. Five factors will be important for the future: 
• Changes in the timing of births (the age of women when 
they have babies) 
• Changes in young people’s values, preferences and 
assessments of personal risks 
• Changes in the characteristics of the population 
• Institutional changes (work and family, gender roles) 
• Economic trends and assessments by young people of 
economic risks 
Timing 
Over a period of about 30 years, first births have been delayed in 
Australia to ever-later ages. This has occurred mainly through a 
spread of the distribution of first births across a much wider 
range of ages than was the case at the end of the 1960s. A sizable 
proportion of first births still occur under age 25 (28 per cent of 
women aged 25 in 2001 had had a first birth) and so there 
remains scope for a continuation of the fall in fertility rates 
under age 25. This would tend to reduce the annual fertility rate 
as births are pushed out to some future year. On the other hand, 
there is recent evidence that women are having first births at a 
somewhat greater rate at all ages in their thirties. This means 
that a tendency to delay the first birth well into the thirties 
among more educated women may be reversing to some extent. 
This will tend to increase annual fertility as births are brought 
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forward in time. Australian data on births by birth order are 
weak and this makes analysis of future trends very speculative. At 
best, current trends suggest that the falls in rates under age 25 
will be at least balanced by the rises in the early 30s, producing a 
slight rise in annual fertility rates. Such a rise was already evident 
in 2005. 
Values changes 
As yet there is little evidence of a strong change in values 
amongst Australians towards having no children at all and the 
dominant value of a preference for two children remains 
(Weston & Qu, 2004). Data on young people’s assessments of 
economic or personal risk are not readily available. However, the 
current long years of good economic times are a positive sign. 
Skilled labour shortages have also improved the economic 
outlook of the present generation of potential young parents. 
Finally, buoyed by the good times that have prevailed across 
their late teens and 20s, ‘generation Y’ are reputedly risk takers. 
Thus, from the perspective of values, we might expect Australian 
fertility to remain at least around its present level of 1.8 births 
per woman. 
Changes in characteristics 
 In each successive generation, Australian women have become 
more highly educated and have been employed for a longer 
period before having their first child. This means that, when 
making a decision about having a baby, an individual woman’s 
own human capital is much higher than it was for women in the 
past in Australia. Higher human capital means greater 
opportunity cost (lost income) from withdrawing from the 
labour force for a time. This is the logic that explains the fall in 
individual fertility as a woman’s human capital level rises. A 
society-wide trend to higher human capital means that the 
aggregate level of fertility would also be expected to fall. This 
situation can be altered through strong government and private 
employer support, such as child care and generous parental 
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leave provisions, for the combination of work and family. For 
example, in Nordic countries today where such work-family 
supports are very evident, the differences in fertility rates by 
education level of women have disappeared (Kravdal, 2001). 
Indeed, in these countries, the more highly educated women are 
beginning to have more children than their lesser-educated 
counterparts because their family income levels are higher. In 
Australia, however, the work-family balance remains 
problematic, and we could not expect the Nordic situation to 
arise in the near future. Also, Australian women are more likely 
than their Nordic counterparts, to want to work on a part-time 
basis, and the opportunities exist to do so. The new industrial 
relations arrangements could reduce the differences in fertility 
between Australian women because they are likely to have a 
greater effect upon women in jobs requiring a lower level of 
human capital than upon other women. All in all, these changes 
are likely to be a dampener on future Australian fertility. 
There are other characteristics that potentially alter the course 
of fertility, such as ethnicity, religion and urban-rural residence. 
Overall, however, while these characteristics are associated  
with fertility, there seems to be a balance between their positive 
and negative effects on fertility. Thus, their impact can be  
largely ignored. 
Institutional changes 
In this discussion, institutional changes refer to the ways that 
society is organised that enhance or reduce the capacity of 
individuals to have children. The present Australian 
Government has demonstrated strong policy support of families 
by greatly increasing the level of government financial benefits 
received by those who have children (Howard, 2006). The new 
Maternity Payment is an outstanding example. There have also 
been gradual changes in the availability of child-care although  
child-care reform is the main type of institutional reform 
presently required in Australia in dealing with the work-family 
balance problem. Finally, workplace arrangements have shifted 
41 
over the past 30 years in ways that are very favourable to the 
combination of work and family. Changes here include the 
ready-availability of part-time work in most jobs, flexible working 
hours, family leave, paid maternity leave (for about 40 per cent 
of the work force) and unpaid parental leave. The relatively high 
level of minimum wages has also played a role in enabling 
partnered women to work part-time but still earn sufficient 
income to meet the family needs. There is little question, 
however, that institutional changes have had a positive effect on 
Australian fertility in recent years. As mentioned above, the new 
industrial relations arrangements could reverse this favourable 
trend, but this is as yet unclear. There is also an argument that 
institutional changes have a greater effect because they change 
the psychology of childbearing; such changes provide to young 
people confidence that the social contribution of having 
children is valued. 
The economic cycle 
It is a lesson of history that a downturn in the economic cycle 
will reduce fertility rates. Until recently, economic cycles 
themselves have been taken for granted – what goes up must 
come down. However, in very recent years, some economists 
have questioned whether the amplitudes of these cycles will be 
as large as they have been in the past – on the grounds that we 
are now better able to manage the economy than we used to be. 
I am not so confident that a large crash is off the agenda, but I 
am confident that our capacity for avoiding it has increased. 
Accordingly, for long-term fertility projections, the best 
assumption that we can make is that economic circumstances 
will continue to improve. This is consistent with the projections 
of future living standards made in two significant recent 
government reports, the Treasury’s Intergenerational Report 
(2002) and the Productivity Commission’s Economic 
Implications of an Ageing Australia (2005a). Both of these 
reports estimate that living standards in Australia will be almost 
double their present levels in 40 years’ time. 
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In summary, it is expected that fertility in Australia will not fall 
to the very low levels now prevailing in many European and East 
Asian countries. The more likely outcome is that in the future 
the fertility rate will remain around an average of about 1.8 
births per woman. Note that this has been the average, with only 
minor fluctuations, for the past 30 years. Barring an immediate 
economic downturn, I expect a rise in Australian fertility in the 
short term. 
The future of mortality in Australia 
Mortality in the future will be related to our capacity to control 
causes of death through both curative and preventative 
measures. This in turn will be related to changes in aspects of 
lifestyle (smoking, alcohol consumption, diet, exercise, etc) and 
to advances in medicine. As death rates in Australia continue to 
be strongly related to economic circumstances, the future state 
of the economy and the distribution of its successes or failures 
will also play a role. 
Over the past 30 years, life expectancy in Australia has been 
rising at the rates of around three years per decade for men and 
2.5 years per decade for women. Similar trends have been 
observed in other advanced countries. There is hot debate 
among demographers as to whether this rate of improvement 
will continue into the future indefinitely or whether it will slow 
down. The argument that it will slow down is based on the 
notion that most of the potential for future falls in mortality is at 
the oldest ages, say, 80 years and over. A life saved at these ages 
adds much less life expectancy of life at birth than a life saved at 
age 60. Furthermore, it is argued that, as each cause of death is 
brought under increasing degrees of control, it becomes harder 
to make the next improvement because avoidance or cures for 
remaining diseases are more intractable. On the other hand, it 
has been argued that expectation of life has been improving at 
an approximately linear rate for some 200 years and there is 
little reason to expect that this trend cannot continue. The 
weight of opinion among Australian demographers is that the 
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future is likely to look like the past: that is, the rate of 
improvement in life expectancy over the past three decades is 
likely to continue into the future (Booth & Tickle, 2004). This 
implies that official government projections (‘the medium 
variant’) greatly underestimate future expectation of life: life 
expectancy for women in 2050 is more likely to be 95 years than 
88 years. The effect, about seven percentage points added to the 
proportion aged 65+ by 2099, will be felt largely beyond 2040.  
Future migration levels 
As argued above, so long as the Australian economy continues to 
be strong, the demand for labour is very likely to exceed its 
supply based on present levels of immigration. New demand for 
service workers including retail workers will be driven by 
increases in living standards and the ageing of the population. 
The building of new infrastructure will be very demanding of 
engineers and skilled trade workers. Similar workers will be 
required by the expanding mining industry. In a multiplicative 
way, the larger population will generate higher housing 
demand, resulting in higher demand for construction workers. 
All of these changes in turn will create demand for managers, 
accountants, computer programmers and so on. While Australia 
needs to focus on training Australian residents across all of these 
required skills, inevitably – as has been the case in Australia since 
the Second World War – high levels of immigration will be 
required to meet the demand. Canada, a country most similar to 
Australia in terms of migration policy and settlement patterns, 
has recently announced that it intends to increase its 
immigration intake to 300,000 per annum within five years 
(Beach et al, 2003). 
The Australian Government reacted to these developments by 
increasing the size of its skilled migration program to its highest 
level ever in 2005-06 (98,000) and it has recently announced that 
the target will remain at that high level in 2006-07 (Department 
of Immigration 2006). The intake in the ‘family’ category was 
also increased in 2006 to 46,000. Thus, with the inclusion of the 
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refugee and humanitarian intake, the total permanent migration 
program now numbers almost 160,000 per annum. On top of 
this, the number of temporary immigrants in Australia, most of 
whom have the right to work, has increased dramatically. 
Working holiday makers now number 104,000 per annum. 
At the same time, young skilled Australians are being attracted 
to overseas countries at an increasing rate. Permanent 
departures from Australia have doubled from around 30,000 per 
annum a decade ago to 60,000 in 2005. The majority of 
immigrants are young Australians rather than former 
immigrants. Many are highly skilled. Most go to the United 
States and the United Kingdom. There is now a global labour 
market for skilled workers and the competition for them 
between countries and companies will become increasingly 
intense in the future. Nevertheless, Australia is heavily engaged 
in developing new approaches to the recruitment of skilled 
immigrants. As a result, it is expected that Australian will be able 
to recruit the immigrants it needs. Hence, for the reasons 
outlined above, it is anticipated that Australia’s annual net 
immigration over the next 50 years will average out at about 50 
per cent higher than its recent levels – that is, about 150,000 per 
annum. In a population projection, this could be implemented 
by increasing the level of annual net immigration by 2000 per 
annum every year for the next 50 years. 
Three indicative projections of Australia’s population 
Based on the above discussion, three indicative projections of 
Australia’s population are given below: 
The Base Projection 
In this projection, the Australian fertility rate is assumed to 
remain constant, on average, at 1.8 births per woman from 2005 
to 2049. Life expectancy is projected to rise on a roughly linear 
basis throughout the period and reach 95.0 years for women in 
2049. Finally, annual net immigration is assumed to remain flat 
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at its present level of around 110,000. The age distribution of 
immigrants and emigrants is assumed to remain unchanged. 
Under these assumptions, the total population of Australia 
would increase from 20.1 million in 2004 to 29.6 million in 2049. 
The age distribution of the projected population is compared 
with the 2004 age distribution in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1. The Base Projection 
Fertility remains constant at 1.8 births per woman 
Expectation of life for women rises to 95.0 years by 2049 
Annual net migration remains constant at 110,000 
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The Low Projection 
In this projection, the Australian fertility rate is assumed to fall 
to 1.3 births per woman from 2005 to 2019 and to remain 
constant at 1.3 thereafter. This is a scenario that reflects the very 
low fertility rate now evident in many European and East Asian 
countries. Life expectancy is projected to rise on a roughly linear 
basis throughout the period and reach 95.0 years for women in 
2049. Finally, annual net migration is assumed to remain flat at 
its present level of around 110,000. The age distribution of 
immigrants and emigrants is assumed to remain unchanged. 
Under these assumptions, the total population of Australia 
would increase from 20.1 million in 2004 to 23.9 million in 2049. 
The age distribution of the projected population is compared 
with the 2004 age distribution in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2. The Low Projection 
Fertility falls to 1.3 births per woman by 2019 
Expectation of life for women rises to 95.0 years by 2050 
Annual net migration falls to 60,000 by 2019 and then remains constant 
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Figure 2.3. The High Projection 
Fertility remains constant at 1.8 births per woman 
Expectation of life for women rises to 95.0 years by 2050 
Annual net migration rises from 110,000 in 2004 by 2000 per annum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The High Projection 
In this projection, the Australian fertility rate is assumed to 
remain constant, on average, at 1.8 births per woman from 2005 
to 2049. Expectation of life is projected to rise on a roughly 
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linear basis throughout the period and reach 95.0 years for 
women in 2049. Finally, annual net migration is assumed, on 
average, to increase by 2000 per annum from an initial level of 
110,000. The age distribution of immigrants and emigrants is 
assumed to remain unchanged. Under these assumptions, the 
total population of Australia would increase from 20.1 million in 
2004 to 31.9 million in 2049. The age distribution of the 
projected population is compared with the 2004 age distribution 
in Figure 2.1 previous. 
Under the Base Projection, the numbers in each age group in 
2049 would be a little higher than they were in 2004 up to about 
age 50. Above age 50, the numbers in 2049 would increase 
gradually as age increases to become considerably larger at the 
oldest ages than they were in 2004. Under the Low Projection, 
the numbers in each age group by 2049 would be much lower 
than in 2004 at the young ages, but would become roughly the 
same as in 2004 by about age 50. Thereafter, the numbers at 
older ages follow the same path as the Base Projection with 
increasingly greater numbers at older ages as age increases. 
Finally, under the High Projection, the result would be rather 
similar to that of the Base Projection, except that the numbers at 
the younger ages (under age 50) would be somewhat larger at 
each age than was the case for the Base Projection. 
Table 2.1, following, shows the results from the three projections 
for two important demographic indicators. The first shows a 
period of the increase in the numbers over 45 years in the 
important workforce ages, 25–39 years. These ages are important 
because they are the ages when the acquisition of the latest high 
technology skills is at their highest. In the Base Projection, the 
numbers increase by 14.7 per cent compared with 26.9 per cent 
for the High Projection. For comparative purposes, note that in 
the 45 years leading up to 2004, the numbers in this age group 
increased by 102 per cent. Thus, each of these two projections 
involves a massive fall in the labour force growth to which the 
Australian economy has become accustomed. It is for this 
reason, in combination with the arguments above about future 
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demand for labour, that the High Projection is considered the 
most likely outcome for Australia. Comparing the Base and High 
Projections on the second indicator, 28.2 per cent of the 
population would be aged 65 years and over in 2049 while the 
percentage would be a little lower at 26.9 per cent for the High 
Projection. 
Table 2.1. Two demographic indicators from the indicative 
projections 
Projection % increase in 
population aged  
25–39, 2004 to 2049 
% of population 
aged 65 and over  
in 2049 
Base 14.7 28.2 
Low -20.5 32.2 
High 26.9 26.9 
 
In contrast to the Base and the High Projections, the results of 
the Low Projection are dismal: a 20.5 per cent fall in the number 
at ages 25–39, and 32.2 per cent of the population aged 65 years 
and over by 2049. These are the kinds of outcomes that many 
countries in Europe and East Asia are now actively trying to 
avoid. For Australia, such population outcomes would be 
associated with poor economic outcomes as people reduced 
their fertility in response to poor economic conditions and as 
the number of immigrants fell and the number of emigrants 
rose. The Low Projection is clearly an undesirable scenario for 
the future. 
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3. 
Demographic changes in Korea during the period of 1960–2000 
Ik Ki Kim 
Introduction 
The population of Korea was more or less stationary until the 
end of the 19th century. From the beginning of the 20th 
century, however, Korea has witnessed a series of population 
changes (Kim I K, 1987). The first sign of these changes was a 
decline in the mortality rate. Korea entered the first stage of 
mortality transition in the 1910s (Lee, 1980). The crude  
death rate (CDR) of 34 per thousand in the 1910s consistently 
declined until the period of the Korean War (1950–53). On  
the other hand, fertility did not show any significant pattern of 
change during the same period. The crude birth rate (CBR)  
was around 40 per thousand. The gap between fertility and 
mortality increased over time and resulted in rapid population 
growth.  
The decade 1945–55 was, along with political, social and 
economic turmoil, a period of disturbance in Korea’s 
demographic situation (Kwon et al, 1975). The liberation of 
Korea in 1945 from Japanese occupation coincided with the 
partition of Korea into North and South. The liberation and 
partition of the country brought about a vast redistribution of 
the Korean population all over the country. During the Korean 
War there was also of course a large number of casualties, 
particularly among young men; and there was a massive flow of 
refugees from North to South.  
The population trends after the Korean War differ in many 
respects from those of earlier periods. Korea experienced a 
‘baby boom’, which peaked in 1959. Since the beginning of the 
1960s, however, South Korea experienced a major population 
transition, from a rapidly growing population to a moderately 
growing one, due to the consistent decline of the fertility rate. In  
